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STEPPING OUT OF PROFESSOR FALLON’S PUZZLE BOX: 
A RESPONSE TO “IF ROE WERE OVERRULED” 
ANN ALTHOUSE* 
INTRODUCTION 
In “If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-Roe 
World,”1 Professor Fallon has presented us with a series of knotty legal 
problems that could conceivably arise if Roe v. Wade were overturned.  
Assigned the task of responding to this piece, I feel a little frustrated by the 
constraint imposed by the structure of his Article, which lays out a wide array 
of hypothetical legal issues.  Instead of using my few pages here to work at 
solving the problems he has raised (or marveling at their hopeless difficulty), I 
want to step out of his puzzle box and assess this scholarly project from the 
outside. 
I.  WHY COLLECT POTENTIAL POST-ROE PROBLEMS? 
Professor Fallon assures us that he does not mean to make an argument 
about whether Roe v. Wade should be overruled.  Indeed, he asserts that he has 
never publicly expressed an opinion on the subject.2  He offers his enumeration 
of potential legal problems in a neutral voice, as if he were simply, perhaps out 
of curiosity, engaging in an interesting hypothetical, performing an academic 
exercise.  But Roe v. Wade is the central legal problem of our time.  It has had 
an astoundingly powerful effect on American politics, influencing presidential 
elections and overwhelming the consideration of Supreme Court nominees.3  
The project of amassing all the legal problems that could conceivably arise if 
 
* Robert W. & Irma M. Arthur-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
 1. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., If Roe Were Overruled: Abortion and the Constitution in a Post-
Roe World, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 611 (2007). 
 2. I am reminded of the assertion made by Clarence Thomas, during his confirmation 
hearings, when asked “Have you ever, private gatherings or otherwise, stated whether you felt 
that [Roe v. Wade] was properly decided or not?,” that he did not recall ever “commenting one 
way or the other.”  Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 222 
(1991).  Justice Thomas’s assertion is widely disbelieved.  See, e.g., Jack Newfield, The Right’s 
Judicial Juggernaut, THE NATION, Oct. 7, 2002, at 11, 13. 
 3. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Day After Roe, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 56. 
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Roe v. Wade were overturned cannot stand apart from the endless political 
debate about whether it should be overturned.  Whether the author intends it or 
not, marshalling the evidence that there are enumerable, perplexing problems 
implicitly makes an argument that it would be unwise to overrule Roe.  To 
portray the post-Roe landscape as a minefield is to say—implicitly—don’t go 
there. 
Those who think Roe is pernicious tend to see something else.  They peer 
out on their own imaginary post-Roe landscape and think it looks sunnily 
inviting.  To overrule Roe would set off a salutary political process—the 
people, whose voices have been squelched for three decades, will finally be 
free to debate with each other, to work through their disagreements, and to 
express their values in statutory form.  In this sunny vision, the states regain 
control of the difficult policy decisions that have burdened the courts for three 
decades, and can, as laboratories of democracy,4 use their newfound power to 
please local majorities, tailoring their legislation to local conditions and 
preferences,5 and individuals sufficiently discomfited by the political 
expression of their fellow citizens can migrate to those places in the country 
that share their conception of the good. 
I am bothered equally by the sanguine optimism of those who would like 
Roe overruled and the risk-aversion that Professor Fallon’s project seems to 
reflect.  Personally, I want to see Roe kept in place not because I am worried 
about the elaborate legal problems that could plague the Court if it is 
overruled, but because I believe women have a right to make decisions about 
what happens inside their own bodies.  I want to preserve the right to privacy, a 
deeply significant matter about which Professor Fallon’s scholarly project has 
nothing to say.  Professor Fallon’s project also says nothing about what 
inspires the passion of Roe’s opponents, the belief in the unborn human being’s 
right to life.6  His is an austerely legalistic project.  Because it does not own up 
to a real commitment to abortion rights, his long enumeration of legal 
problems seems to express timidity, risk-aversion, and a fear of democracy.  
One suspects that he really supports abortion rights but thinks—perhaps 
correctly—that the law professor wields a stronger power by standing aloof 
from political preferences and deploying the sort of expert knowledge that 
 
 4. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 5. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1484, 1485 (1987). 
 6. During the final question session at the Childress Lecture, a lone gentleman who had sat 
through the day rose and spoke passionately about the right to life and the unsettling feeling he 
had listening to people talking about abortion all day without expressing any regard for the 
unborn child.  From inside Professor Fallon’s puzzle box, the man had no point at all.  His was a 
naïve layman’s point to be heard out politely, and then ignored as the professionals turned their 
eyes back to the serious, lawyerly project. 
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makes the voices of those who speak with passion about rights and democratic 
choice seem naïve and almost irrelevant. 
This professorial restraint, like its close cousin judicial restraint, can be 
powerful. It can disarm critics.  Not only does it seem disconnected from 
policy preferences, but it also displays dazzling scholarly expertise, 
expounding on doctrinal matters as arcane as desuetude, overbreadth, and 
choice of law.  Professor Fallon asks us to be skeptical of the call for judicial 
restraint and to think in a sophisticated way about whether it is possible for the 
Court to get out of “the abortion-umpiring business”7—as Justice Scalia has 
recommended.  And this is indeed an important message.  Yet, just as we 
should be skeptical of the idea that judges can rid themselves of the abortion 
matter, we should be skeptical of whether Professor Fallon has overstated the 
complexity of the post-Roe travails. 
II.  WOULD OVERRULING ROE UNLEASH DECENTRALIZED DEMOCRACY? 
There is some point in trying to detail all the legal problems that could 
arise. Surely, it is a mistake to focus on the goal of overturning Roe without 
anticipating the various consequences.  Nevertheless, we should also resist the 
assumption that majoritarian politics will unleash a spate of unstoppable legal 
problems.  Even if constitutional rights no longer brake the political process, 
the human actors who drive it will observe the effect of their actions and 
respond to the changed circumstances.  To illustrate what I mean, let me focus 
on just one of the problems Professor Fallon has raised, the federalism 
question.  It is commonly assumed that if Roe v. Wade were overturned, the 
states would regain control over abortion issues.8  But Congress would also be 
tempted to legislate, either to limit abortion or to protect abortion rights.  If it 
did, the Court would need to examine whether constitutional power supports 
that legislation, an inquiry that—as Professor Fallon notes—would almost 
certainly concentrate on the Commerce Clause.9 
 
 7. Fallon, supra note 1, at 613 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)). 
 8. See, e.g., Clark D. Forsythe & Stephen B. Presser, The Tragic Failure of Roe v. Wade: 
Why Abortion Should Be Returned to the States, 10 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 85 (2005). 
 9. The prospect of exercising power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
dim, as Professor Fallon notes.  Fallon, supra note 1 at 622.  Unless the Court were to overrule 
Roe v. Wade by finding the unborn to be persons within the meaning of Section One of the 
Amendment, legislation limiting abortion could not be portrayed as a “congruent and 
proportional” remedy for the violation of Section One rights, as required by current doctrine.  See 
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (noting that any remedy imposed 
by Congress for a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment must be “congruent and proportional to 
the targeted violation”).  There is some potential to portray legislation protecting abortion rights 
as a “congruent and proportional” remedy for the violation of Section One Equal Protection rights 
against discrimination based on sex, but it seems quite unlikely that the Court that would overrule 
Roe would look for clever ways to characterize abortion rights as a remedy for sex discrimination, 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
764 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:761 
Professor Fallon thinks that Congress’s power is fairly clear—providing 
abortions is a commercial matter, and thus, under existing doctrine, it is 
enough that the activity to be regulated, taken in the aggregate, has a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce.10 There might be some difficulty if 
providers were to offer their services for free, but Professor Fallon asserts that 
this situation would fall within the doctrine articulated in the recent case of 
Gonzales v. Raich,11 which upheld Congress’s power to regulate homegrown, 
home-consumed marijuana.12  I do not think Raich applies so easily, because in 
that case, the Court emphasized Congress’s interest in controlling the market, 
down to its smallest components, including a substance that only had potential 
to flow into the market.13  But this concept does not apply to services.  An 
abortion provided free of charge is not a marketable commodity that can be 
taken somewhere else and sold.  More importantly, as Professor Fallon 
recognizes, “a ‘conservative’ Supreme Court that was prepared to overrule Roe 
might also be prepared to redefine and limit Congress’s commerce power to 
avoid this conclusion.”14 
To think about what the Court would do with respect to the Commerce 
Clause question, we need to think about what the states and Congress might 
do.  Consider the permutations.  Congress might hold back and do nothing, or 
it might rush into the newly opened field and pass preemptive legislation.  If it 
does pass legislation, it might either ban abortion, regulate it in some more or 
less severe way, or protect abortion rights (perhaps completely reinstating what 
is now seen as a matter of constitutional right).  The states, for their part, 
would have the same options, either to ban or restrict abortion or to protect 
abortion rights to one degree or another.  The federalism questions that would 
face the Court would depend on what these different institutions did, when 
 
despite the stretching to use the heightened scrutiny of sex discrimination to find Section Five 
power supporting the Family and Medical Leave Act in Nevada Department of Human Resources 
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728–29 (2003).  See Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States: 
Federalism and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745 (2004) (demonstrating how much 
the Court stretched in Hibbs).  There, the Court saw Congress as quite broadly empowered to 
eliminate sex stereotypes in the workplace, but this was not because Congress was easing family 
burdens that make it harder for women to participate equally in the workplace; it was because 
employers, relying on stereotypes about how often men and women take on various family 
responsibilities, treated men and women differently in deciding how much family leave to offer.  
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728–29.  In any case, if the Court is inclined to support post-Roe abortion 
regulation at the federal level, the commerce power is a much simpler, more direct approach.  The 
question of whether there is Section Five power should therefore only arise if there is an effort to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity to provide for retrospective relief against the state. 
 10. Fallon, supra note 1 at 622–23. 
 11. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 12. Fallon, supra note 1, at 623. 
 13. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15–22. 
 14. Fallon, supra note 1 at 624. 
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they chose to act, and what the real-world effects of their actions would be.  I 
tend to think that the answers the Court would give about the scope of 
Congress’s power would depend on this context, particularly to the degree that 
its own step of overruling Roe rested on a belief in the salutary effect of 
returning the abortion matter to the political processes of the states. 
Did Congress jump in early and prevent those processes from taking place?  
Or did Congress—demonstrating some wisdom about the value of 
federalism15—leave room for the states to have the political debates that Roe 
preempted long ago?  And if Congress did hold back, what did the states do?  
Did the states win respect with lucid political debate and careful legislation, or 
did they devolve into petty political squabbling and poorly drawn or repressive 
statutes?  Did Congress observe the development of legislation in the states 
and only go forward with preemptive federal law at a point where the political 
activity in the states had proven dysfunctional or where a clear majority of the 
states had found good answers to difficult problems and where the remaining 
states had begun to look retrograde and backward? 
One might look at these permutations and conclude that Roe should not be 
overruled.  The consequences are disturbingly unpredictable.  This is the 
implicit theory, I believe, of Professor Fallon’s article.  But we ought to see 
that this potential could be a positive thing.  We would learn something 
valuable, where now we simply wonder and make assertions about what would 
happen.  And there would be numerous institutions in play to control excessive 
or abusive behavior.  Ideally, the states would act without interference from 
Congress and would finally work through the bitter divisions that Roe 
prevented from being the subject of political debate and compromise.  But if 
Congress activated itself too early and short-circuited the process, the Court 
would be in a position to do something with the constitutional law of 
federalism.  It could use commerce power doctrine to preserve the separate 
functioning of the state.  The doctrine established in United States v. Lopez16 
and United States v. Morrison17—crafted by the now departed Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist—is murky and unstable and could be reworked by the 
new Supreme Court to express more clearly normative values of federalism.  If 
Congress, on the other hand, holds back while the states perform adequately or 
until bad effects emerge at the state level, the Court may be expected to defer 
to Congress in the way that the existing doctrine easily permits. 
 
 15. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985) (expressing 
deference to Congress as the best judge of what the division of power between the states and 
federal government ought to be). 
 16. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 17. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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CONCLUSION 
Professor Fallon presents the post-Roe world as a series of perplexing and 
unpredictable legal problems that would trouble the Court, but I think it would 
be more accurate to visualize political processes, long stopped up and finally 
unlocked.  Political actors would begin to make their moves, met by responses 
from other political actors, and, at length, by the courts.  It is surely true that 
we would trade one set of legal problems for another, and that the dream of 
excluding the courts from the abortion matter is just a dream, but the question 
is whether there is reason to prefer the new set of problems.  In the end, one’s 
answer to this question is likely to replicate one’s policy preference about 
abortion.  Just as, I suspect, Professor Fallon’s project is motivated by a 
support for abortion rights, I think those who oppose abortion will see his 
collection of legalistic problems as long and complicated but not nearly as 
troublesome as the questions about the scope of constitutional rights that have 
burdened the courts for so long. 
 
